Jargon alert : Arbitrage by Kevin Bryan
A
n economist is walking to lunch with an old friend.
The friend stops, startled, and calls out, “Look at
that hundred dollar bill on the sidewalk! How about
that?” The economist walks right past it, telling his friend,
“If there had been a hundred dollars there, someone would
have picked it up already.”
This joke gets to the heart of a key economic 
principle: Opportunities for risk-free profit in markets 
disappear quickly. Such profit is called arbitrage.
More specifically, arbitrage tends to refer to a difference
in pricing of the same commodity or asset in two different
markets. For example, imagine that MP3 players sell for $50
in Thailand and a buyer in California is willing to pay 
$100 per player. If shipping costs are $10 per player, a firm
could make $40 per player by buying in Bangkok and 
selling in San Diego. This profit opportunity might exist
briefly, but soon other people will catch on, driving up the
prices of MP3 players in Thailand, driving them down in
California, or both.  
A more realistic example is “triangular arbitrage” in the
currency market. Imagine you can get a euro for $1.25 from
Broker A, a British pound for 1.5 euros
from Broker B, and a dollar for 50
pence (half of a British pound) from
Broker C. In this case, you could 
convert $100 to 80 euros at Broker A,
then convert the euros to 53.33
pounds at Broker B, and finally 
convert the pounds to $106.66 for a
profit of $6.66 per cycle. Investment
houses have teams of analysts 
constantly on the lookout for these
types of arbitrage cycles.
Many economic ideas are derived
from the fact that arbitrage opportunities do not last. 
The concept of “covered interest rate parity” states that a
currency future, or a contract to buy or sell a fixed amount of
currency at some date in the future, can be priced solely by
knowing the risk-free interest rate in both currencies and the
current exchange rate. An example of a nearly risk-free U.S.
interest rate is a short-term treasury bond, where default is 
almost unthinkable.
Imagine that the current exchange rate is $1.25 per euro,
that the annual euro risk-free interest rate is 12 percent, and
that the annual dollar risk-free interest rate is 5 percent. 
In this case, a euro-dollar futures contract expiring in 12
months would be $1.172 per euro. Why? Imagine that the
futures contract was $1.20 per euro. A firm could borrow
$100 at 5 percent interest, meaning the firm will owe the
bank $105 in one year. The firm would then convert $100 to
80 euros at the current exchange rate and invest the euros in
a bond paying 12 percent. In one year, the firm would have
89.6 euros, which they could convert back to dollars at $1.20
per euro, giving them $107.52. After paying the bank $105, 
the firm is left with $2.52 in profit. This profit is risk-free
because every component — the interest rates, the current
exchange rate, and the futures rate — was locked in from 
the beginning. An equivalent example can be constructed for
futures rates lower than $1.172 per euro, where the investor
would borrow euros and invest in American bonds.
The amount of money chasing these arbitrage opportu-
nities is immense. The Bank for International Settlements 
estimates that more than $1 trillionin foreign exchange swaps
and futures are traded every day, and foreign exchange is only
one of a vast number of markets with arbitrage possibilities. 
Problems can arise, however, when firms chase 
price differential where risks are involved. Some of the
biggest investment houses and hedge funds in the world 
have been bankrupted by tantalizing “almost risk-free” 
profits. One of the most notorious failures in recent 
years is that of Long Term Capital
Management (LTCM).
LTCM was a hedge fund run by a
team of top investors, including two
who won Nobel Prizes in economics
for their work on pricing assets,
which made immense profits in the
mid-1990s through a complex bond
price arbitrage. In the summer of
1998, however, Russia defaulted on a
number of its bonds, causing
investors to shift their holdings of
bonds in Europe and Japan into U.S.
Treasury bonds, which were considered the world’s safest.
Though world bond prices eventually returned to values
more in line with economic fundamentals, this flight away
from European and Japanese bonds resulted in a 
$3.5 billion bailout and the fund was closed for good by early
2000. LTCM’s bond purchases were not really arbitrage at
all, since there was unhedged risk that allowed a small chance
for catastrophic losses.
The moral? True arbitrage opportunities are a rarity in the
real world. Many of them would be better described as 
entrepreneurial opportunities that may prove profitable but
also carry with them real risk. So the next time someone 
presents you with a “can’t-lose” scheme that seems too good
to be true, act like an economist and keep on walking past
that illusory profit. RF
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